BELOW PLEASE FIND THE ABSTRACT, THEN THE COMPLETE
CHAPTER
CHAPTER ELEVEN
(=pages 211-228)
Roger Penrose, Rupert Sheldrake, And The Future Of
Consciousness
(by Charles Tandy)
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Death
And Anti-Death, Volume 11:
Ten Years After
Donald Davidson (1917-2003)
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Abstract Of Pages 211-228
CHAPTER
ELEVEN
Roger Penrose, Rupert
Sheldrake, And The Future Of Consciousness
Charles Tandy
Roger
Penrose argues that consciousness must be hyper-algorithmic (not-computable).
Penrose suggested we study the brain with a view to how macro-level quantum
effects might take place there despite the hostile (noisy, hot) environment;
recent empirical developments in quantum biology seem to support Penrose.
Penrose says a hyper-algorithmic quantum theory is needed. Rupert Sheldrake points
out that contrary to traditional scientific dogma, the universe may be
non-entropic; serious theories (Big Bang; Cosmic Inflation) by prominent living
physicists seem to lead to such a conclusion. If Penrose (on consciousness) and Sheldrake (on entropy) are both
correct, then the future may bring a never-ending expansion of consciousness
rather than its extinction.
KEYWORDS: Entropy; Energy; Computation;
Quantum biology; Determinism; Hyperalgorithmity; Algorithm; Kurt Gödel; Quantum
gravity; Cohomology.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
Roger Penrose, Rupert Sheldrake, And The Future Of
Consciousness
Charles Tandy
§1. First Remarks
§2.
Penrose on Consciousness
§3. Sheldrake on Entropy
§4. Last Remarks
§5. Appendix on
Quantum Biology
§6. Notes
§7. Bibliography
§1. First
Remarks
Some folks
believe they are competent in both science and philosophy. Upon closer
examination, I typically find such persons competent in only science or
philosophy (or neither). Roger Penrose and Rupert Sheldrake seem to be
exceptional in that they are competent in both scientific and philosophical
endeavors. Of course, being competent does not mean that your creative ideas,
whether scientific or philosophical, are correct.
Most new
ideas, even by highly competent individuals, are bad ideas. With this in mind,
I am going to present some of the thoughts of Roger Penrose and of Rupert
Sheldrake that I find well argued -- thoughts (in the event they should prove
sufficiently fruitful) with "revolutionary" implications for the
future of consciousness. These thoughts tend to fall on the intersection of
science and philosophy. Below I have selected only a few hypotheses (of many)
that have been proposed by Penrose and by Sheldrake. More specifically, I will
focus on consciousness (according to Penrose) and on entropy (according to
Sheldrake), with a view toward the future of consciousness.
§2. Penrose
on Consciousness
Until the
20th century, it was assumed by many scientists that the laws of nature were
both deterministic and mechanistic. Today, many quantum physicists no longer
believe in universal determinism but do believe that all science worth having
must be mechanistic (computable or algorithmic). It is assumed by many
scientists that human behavior (and related matters -- e.g., consciousness)
must be explainable in a mechanical-computable or chemical-biological kind of
way.
But Roger
Penrose and others have developed arguments as to why consciousness must,
instead, be non-algorithmic (not-computable). 1 Penrose has
suggested that this should lead us to investigate whether or how there are
quantum effects at the macro-level in animal or human brains that might help us
understand how it is possible for matter to be aware or conscious. Penrose
pointed out that room temperature or brain temperature did not seem to support his argument even though otherwise his argument
seemed to make sense. Penrose suggested we study the brain with a view to how
macro-level quantum effects might take place there despite the hostile (noisy,
hot) environment. (Today's quantum computers require extreme cold to avoid
decoherence by thermal vibrations, but the brain operates at warm biological
temperatures.)
Recent
empirical developments seem to support Penrose even more than he expected. 2 Penrose is calling for more empirical
studies, as he does not think it wise to rely on only a few surprising results
even when the experiments were carried out with integrity. The recent results
seem to say that macro-level quantum effects are important in biological
photosynthesis, in avian magneto-reception, and in biological microtubule
function. In other words, one is now tempted to say that macro-level quantum
effects are common or ubiquitous in biological organisms. If we set up the
proper empirical experiments, present technology allows us to study such
(apparent) "macro-level" quantum effects. Present technology even
allows us to study (subatomic) "particle-level" quantum effects
(e.g., using the new super-collider in the vicinity of Geneva, Switzerland); on
the other hand: "No [empirical] experiment to date seems to have yet got
very close to exploring the [much smaller] 'quantum-gravity' level." 3
Penrose
asks us to consider whether quantum theory should be modified or superseded if
we are to properly explain animal awareness or human consciousness. Just as
scientific explanation no longer requires a deterministic theory, perhaps we
should now ask whether scientific explanation requires a mechanistic
(algorithmic or computational) theory. In the present paper, I will refer to
the Penrose (non-computational) approach to consciousness as "ha"
theory or HyperAlgorithmity.
Penrose
explains that wave-particle (or U-R: Unitary evolution - state Reduction)
quantum theory is as much self-contradictory as it is complementary. (U or
Unitary evolution is continuous and deterministic; R or state Reduction is
discontinuous and probabilistic.) M. C. Escher knew Penrose and drew the
famous, and famously impossible, Penrose Triangle or Tribar. (The study of such
impossibilities is known as cohomology, which requires a holistic or nonlocal
view of things.) Penrose suggests that present quantum theory is likewise
impossible. One can study any one part of the Penrose Triangle and it makes
perfect sense. It is only if one ("consciously"?) stands back and
attempts to take in the entire Tribar that one sees or understands that it is
impossible. Likewise, according to Penrose, we have fitted parts together to
get our standard quantum theory; when we stand back, we can see that quantum
theory is made of (wave-particle or U-R) parts that ultimately do not fit
together. Quantum theory otherwise seems workable and useful, and perhaps this
is the best we can do. But Penrose says that quantum theory needs to be
modified or superseded if we are to explain non-algorithmic realities such as
awareness or understanding or reflection or "standing back" or
creative imagination or consciousness. It seems that there must be hyperalgorithmic
laws of nature, as yet undiscovered.
Some may
say that our brain or consciousness operates (entirely) according to
algorithms. However unless one simply posits this as an assumption, this seems
unlikely; it does not seem to capture human experiences such as red
perceptions, sad feelings, creative insights, and our time-asymmetric struggles
for truth, justice, and world betterment. Penrose maintains that biological
evolution would not select for those skilled at building grand mathematical theories
but would select for those who can understand
a wide variety of many things -- this
includes empathetic understanding of the behavior of animals (and how to avoid
or kill or domesticate them). "Human beings develop this quality
of general understanding
and it is not
a computa-tional quality because
mathematical understanding is not." 4 Consciousness is functional and not a
meaningless mere-epiphenomenon. This seems to be the case for many animals,
including humans.
Penrose
suggests that conscious intelligence requires understanding (and that
understanding requires awareness) -- but an algorithm or computational system
does not have conscious intelligence or understanding. Chess "is a
computational game and so ultimately it would be possible to compute every
possibility" 5
; this means that the mere human (with
no computer assistance) must ultimately experience defeat in a contest with a
computer sufficiently advanced (say, at approximately a year 1999 level of
computer chess-playing sophistication). Human chess players understand when
they have lost a chess match, but computer chess players do not understand when
they have won a chess match. Consciousness goes beyond calculation or, rather,
is different from calculation. Some chess problems easy for humans are
difficult for computers, and some chess problems easy for (brute force or huge
memory) computers are difficult for humans. It is well documented in the
literature that computers play chess differently than the way humans do. A computer
and a human would tackle the following task very differently: "Find an odd
number that is the sum of two even numbers." 6 A human may
have limited ability to understand and limited ability to calculate, while a
computer has no ability to understand but hugely impressive ability to
calculate (and to store memory). Show your children various examples of numbers
(using, say, apples and blocks and pennies) and (to the pleasure of Plato) they
will come to understand the notion of numbers; we do not give our children a set of rules or algorithms in order to
acquire such a notion.
Consciousness is very different from anything else we know about in the
universe. Consciousness is outrageous! It seems that a new, even outrageous,
scientific theory is needed unless we choose to ignore the fact of
consciousness.
Mathematics is the language of science. Some branches of mathematics are
Algorithmic (computational); other branches of mathematics are HyperAlgorithmic
(not-computational). NB: Mathematical models do not have to be algorithmic! According to Penrose, HyperAlgorithmic
mathematical models and theories (whether deterministic or nondeterministic) --
when they fit empirical experimental results -- should be permitted to count as
scientific explanations. Indeed, mathematicians such as Penrose have used the
tiling of a plane with polyominoes to construct toy (model) universes that are
deterministic but are not computable;
"The different states of this [rule-based] deterministic but
non-computable toy universe are given in terms of pairs of finite sets of
polyominoes." 7 (Clearly, determinism and computability are not the same thing.) Penrose also asks
if the (inconsistent or contradictory) mathematical formalisms we paste
together and call (probabilistic or nondeterministic) quantum theory should
count as a proper scientific explanation of actual reality. Stephen Hawking
weighs in: "All I'm concerned with is that the theory should predict the
results of measurements." 8
In 1874,
Thomas Henry Huxley argued that consciousness is a mere epiphenomena of
(particular) physical interactions. Today such issues are sometimes discussed
using thought experiments involving philosophical zombies (hypothetical
entities that look and act like humans, but lack consciousness). For example,
one may ask if both zombies and humans are reducible to computations or
algorithms running on (human-body-appearing) hardware. Moreover, if
consciousness is more than a mere epiphenomena, then macro level events are involved
in consciousness and conscious behavior. Using hypothetical thought
experiments, one may sometimes seem to be able to conjure-up at least three
different kinds of "humanoid" entities as follows: (1) Mere-zombies
(entities that look and act like humans, but lack consciousness); (2)
Zombies-plus (entities that look and act like humans, and have consciousness as
a mere epiphenomena); and, (3) Human-persons (entities that look and act like
humans, and have consciousness of the sort where macro level events are
involved with consciousness and conscious behavior). To what extent the actions
or behaviors of these various (conjured-up) entities may or may not be
predictable, whether in principle or in practice, is beyond the purview of the
present article.
Presumably, Penrose's ha theory (not yet
invented!) would explain not only ("human-person") consciousness but
also quantum gravity and the weirdness of quantum events. Many readers are
aware of nonlocality (or weird "action at a distance" which nevertheless
is said not to be in contradiction to
Relativity theory). But recent decades have presented us with additional
strange findings from empirical experiments. I quote Penrose: 9
It is quite
extraordinary that quantum mechanics enables you to test whether something might have happened but didn't happen.
It tests what philosophers call counterfactuals.
It is remarkable that quantum mechanics allows real effects to result from
counterfactuals!
According to
philosopher of science Abner Shimony: 10
The most radical
concept of quantum theory is that a complete state of the system … is not
exhausted by a catalogue of actual properties of the system but must include
potentialities. … this indefiniteness is objective. … These features of
objective indefiniteness, objective chance and objective probability are summed
up by characterizing the quantum state as a network of potentialities.
Penrose believes that ha theory may use geometry (as
distinguished from computation), use notions of spacetime (as distinguished
from notions of space), and use so-called complex numbers or perhaps even
higher-genus numbers beyond complex numbers (as distinguished from so-called
real numbers).
Penrose
would also like to think that ha theory (to appear sometime in the 21st
century) may suggest to us an ontology of some sort, or will be consistent with
his own personal philosophy of reality; nevertheless, he is not sure that his
own ontology is itself self-consistent (see below). However "present-day
quantum mechanics has no credible ontology." 11 Penrose
hypothesizes that the World consists of at least three ontological realms or
worlds he labels Platonic, Physical, and Mental. The Platonic realm is
identified with mathematics, which is objective, timeless, spaceless, and
necessary; it exists absolutely or necessarily. (Penrose is willing to allow us
to further identify this realm with the Good, the True, the Beautiful.) Part of
the Platonic world seems to have a direct (if mysterious) relationship to the
Physical world; after all, mathematics is the language of physics. Part of the
Physical realm seems to have a direct (if mysterious) relationship to Mental
reality. In turn, part of the Mental world seems to have a direct (if
mysterious) relationship to mathematics or the Platonic realm. One may then
step back in order to view holistically Penrose's ("non-dual-istic"!) tri-model of reality: The "impossible triangle" of the
three ontological realms seems to have a part
of each world encompassing the whole
of the next. Perhaps each world "thinks it owns" all three worlds;
however Penrose also broaches the notion that it is indeed Platonic reality
that ultimately governs all three realms.
§3.
Sheldrake on Entropy
Like Roger
Penrose, Rupert Sheldrake finds "universal mechanisticism" (my words)
quite unbelievable. But unlike Penrose, Sheldrake tends to use the term
"materialism" (or, sometimes, "physicalism") for this view
of the world. (That is, in Penrose's view, Roger Penrose is attempting to
discover and articulate new physical laws -- hyperalgorithmic ones --
applicable to the physical universe.) The reader should keep in mind these
various uses of words or terms (and related words or terms) when interpreting
(below) what Sheldrake says about entropy. Many scientists and thinkers
(including Bertrand Russell and H. G. Wells) used to believe in something like
a Final Law of Entropy, by which was meant that the universe must inevitably
run down.
Isaac
Newton maintained, for theological reasons, that the universe would end in a
singularity sometime before the year 2345 (but not before the year 2060). 12 Sheldrake is "convinced that the
sciences, for all their successes, are being stifled by outmoded beliefs"
such as that the universe will in the long run necessarily run down, arriving
at a bland entropic end state. 13 Today, this belief by many scientists is not
based on theology but on universal-materialism (hereinafter:
"materialism"). But it is impossible to consistently hold to
materialism, says Sheldrake: "Is a scientist operating mechanistically
when he proposes a theory of materialism? … he believes he is putting forward
views that are true, not just doing what his brain makes him do." 14 Sheldrake advocates against mechanism and
against vitalism, and for holism (organism-ism).
For many
scientists, a major building block in their belief in materialism and in
entropy is known as the First Law of Thermodynamics (conservation of matter and
energy). But according to Sheldrake, "no" is the more likely correct
answer to the question "Is the total amount of matter and energy always
the same?" For example, the Big Bang theory of the origin of the universe
is widely accepted -- however: "There was no conservation of matter and
energy if the universe arose from nothing." 15
Then there
is the Second Law of Thermodynamics; often in the past it was identified as the
entropy law. Social scientist Kenneth Boulding explained it this way: 16
The entropy concept
is an unfortunate one, something like phlogiston (which turned out to be
negative oxygen), in the sense that entropy is negative potential. We can
generalize the second law in the form of a law of diminishing potential rather
than of increasing entropy, stated in the form: If anything happens, it is
because there was a potential for it happening, and after it has happened that
potential has been used up. This form of stating the law opens up the
possibility that potential might be re-created in particular forms. An example
would be the biological potential of the fertilized egg for producing the life
history of the corresponding organism. This potential is gradually used up as
the organism ages; finally it is exhausted and the organism dies. If, however,
in the process the organism fertilizes another egg, the biological potential is
re-created, though never of course in exactly the same form.
If a physicist ignores things like biological
evolution and evolving biological complexity, and pretends or postulates that
the universe is an isolated system, then the physicist may be tempted to
conclude from the Second Thermodynamics Law that the universe must inevitably
run down. While most scientists and most physicists are not cosmologists
(cosmological physicists), some of the
more serious cosmological theories today -- since the recent inference
that so-called dark energy makes up over 70% of the matter-energy of the
universe -- tell a different story: "Far from running out of steam, the
universe is now like a perpetual-motion machine, expanding because of dark
energy, and creating more dark energy by expanding." 17
Thinkers
have long speculated as to the relationship between physics and biology. For
many decades a standard picture has been that biological systems are islands of
order (or anti-entropy) within, or produced at the expense of, an otherwise
increasingly disorderly (or entropic) universe. Such an image can be used to
explain why either entropy or anti-entropy or both may increase in the future.
Such a picture is a kind of explanation rather than an argument; Sheldrake is
asking us to look at the arguments (per above and below). Sheldrake is not
claiming to know the correct answer beyond all doubt, but is emphasizing that
there are good reasons to seriously doubt the old entropic view.
Two
arguments which Sheldrake does not greatly emphasize I will now emphasize; one
argument (or cosmological theory) comes from Eric J. Chaisson and the other
from Roger Penrose. Eric J. Chaisson is a physicist and systems scientist of
considerable status. This is a shortcut way of saying that I will simply and
briefly present the conclusions of his argument in Cosmic Evolution: The Rise of Complexity in Nature. Chaisson
explains why there is good reason to believe that the universe may be immortal.
Chaisson explains why there is good reason to believe that cosmic evolution may
be never-ending. In short, it seems that our universe is increasing in both (!) disorder/entropy/randomness and order/negentropy/information. Chaisson
attempts to explain in physical- and systems-science terms how this putatively
paradoxical situation works and how the evolution of complexity can be
never-ending. The classical (deterministic) physics of old used to predict an
ultimate entropic end state for the universe. But (p.29) "a more modern
analysis is not so dire, suggesting that the maximum possible entropy will
likely never be attained. In an expanding Universe, the actual and maximum
entropies both increase, yet not at the same rate; a gap opens between them and
grows larger over the course of time, causing the Universe to increasingly
depart from [an end-of-the-universe or final-entropy scenario.] … We need not
be so pessimistic, indeed it is this inability of the cosmos to ever reach true
maximum disorder that allows order, or lack of disorder, to emerge in
localized, open systems." Indeed (p.219), a "perpetual [!] stream
toward richness, diversity, and complexity, the outcome of which cannot be
foreseen, may be the true fate of the Universe."
Now I
preface Roger Penrose's Cycles of Time:
Today's cosmological physicists and quantum physicists study the very large and
the very small respectively. They seem quite willing to speculate that in one
physical context gravity may act as an attracting force and in another physical
context gravity may act as a repelling force. Thus (once again) depending on
how we choose to use our terminology, we may be tempted to say that gravity in
one context becomes anti-gravity in another context. I mention this so as to
try by analogy to introduce Penrose's Cycles
of Time theory. Might thermodynamics in one physical context act as an
entropic force and in another physical context act as an anti-entropic force?
Or, to put it another way, contrary to standard big-bang theory, is the Cycles of Time theory correct that
universal thermodynamics combined with cosmic inflation necessarily and always
lead to a never-ending series of big-bang "beginnings" (as if the
universe perpetually reinvents itself over an infinity of ever-expanding eons)?
I must admit to not understanding the Cycles
of Time mathematics, but the upshot is that a dynamic universe always has
existed and a dynamic universe always will exist (that is, in the event the
Penrose theory of perpetual big-bangs should be correct). Others have offered
other theories -- serious non-big-bang theories or serious multiverse theories
that are ultimately non-entropic (as used herein, non-entropic obviously means
"no necessary ultimate final end or running down of the
universe/multiverse" -- as distinguished from meaning
"non-thermodynamic"). Based on the present paragraph and the previous
paragraphs, it seems easy enough to conclude that whether one accepts the
standard big-bang theory or another serious scientific theory, it is reasonable
to (tentatively) reject the Final Law of Entropy concept.
Few
scientists, including Sheldrake, are prepared to accept Penrose's Cycles of Time theory. However on the
other hand, Sheldrake emphasizes that some of the (serious) theories say that
the vacuum of spacetime at the quantum level is full of energy; indeed, many
quantum physicists alive today believe this to be the case. Sheldrake suggests
that future technology may be able to tap into zero-point (quantum-vacuum)
energy for practical use. Moreover, beyond this, at a more down-to-earth
biological level, Sheldrake himself argues at length that the actual empirical
"evidence for energy conservation in living organisms is weak." 18 Considerations such as the above seem to
tell scientists and nonscientists alike that entropy is a fake in that it does
not have the last word.
§4. Last
Remarks
Thus, ha
theory may be said to have the last laugh. In a non-entropic universe,
hyperalgorithmic consciousness may continue to continue to continue without
end. A so-called "technological singularity" identifiable with
hyperalgorithmic superconscious-ness (as distinguished from algorithmitic
supercomputation) may be in our future. As Penrose puts it, "it might be
possible to have a conscious entity that is not biological at all, in the sense
that we use the term 'biology' at the present time; but it would not be
possible for an entity be conscious if it did not incorporate the particular
type of physical process [HyperAlgorithmity]
that I maintain is an essential." 19 If this is so, then the future may bring a
never-ending expansion of consciousness rather than its extinction. In the
words of the great Isaac Asimov: "Once we expect theories to collapse and
to be supplanted by more useful generalizations, the collapsing theory becomes
not the gray remnant of a broken today, but the herald of a new and brighter
tomorrow." 20-21
§5. Appendix
on Quantum Biology
Are there
macro-level quantum effects in biological organisms? Some recent empirical
results seem to say that macro-level quantum effects are important in a wide
variety of (or in all?) biological organisms. This apparently includes
processes related to biological photosynthesis, avian magneto-reception, and biological
microtubule function.
Here are
some relevant citations:
"Quantum Biology: Current Status and
Opportunities"
Institute of Advanced Studies,
10 presentations plus a filmed group discussion.
(Held on
<www.ias.surrey.ac.uk/workshops/quantumbiology/report.php>.
"Quantum Effects in Biological Systems 2012"
37 presentations.
(Held on
<www.regonline.com/builder/site/Default.aspx?EventID=1063537>.
"Quantum Biology and the Hidden Nature of
Nature"
World Science Festival.
(Held on
3 participants plus 1
moderator.
<www.worldsciencefestival.com/events/quantum-biology>.
[Updated URL: <http://worldsciencefestival.com/videos/quantum_biology>.]
"Research Projects -- Quantum Biology"
Theoretical and Computational Biophysics Group,
19 papers plus 9 ongoing research projects.
<www.ks.uiuc.edu/Research/Categories/Quantum>.
Quantum Consciousness (Website of Stuart Hameroff,
M.D.).
<www.quantumconsciousness.org>.
Center for Consciousness Studies at the
(Directed by Stuart Hameroff, M.D.).
Available from <www.consciousness.arizona.edu>.
For example, see:
Bandyopadhyay, Anirban (2010). Direct Experimental
Evidence for Quantum States in Microtubules and Topological Invariance. Toward a Science of Consciousness 2011
Abstracts.
Bandyopadhyay, Anirban (2011). Study of
Opto-Electronic Properties of a Single Microtubule in the Microwave Regime.
From <www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA554174>.
Google Workshop on
Quantum Biology (
Available from <www.youtube.com>.
For example, see:
Bandyopadhyay, Anirban (2010). Experimental Studies on
a Single Microtubule.
For example, see:
Hameroff, Stuart (2010). Clarifying the Tubulin
Bit/Qubit -- Defending the Penrose-Hameroff Orch OR Model of Quantum
Computation in Microtubules.
For example, see:
Neven, Hartmut
(2010). Welcome and Introduction. "Surprisingly robust quantum effects
have been observed in warm biological systems."
Engel, Gregory S., et al. (2007). Evidence for
Wavelike Energy Transfer through Quantum Coherence in Photosynthetic Systems. Nature, 446, pp.782-6.
Ball, Philip (2011). Physics of Life: The Dawn of
Quantum Biology. Nature, 474,
pp.272-4.
Sahu, Satyajit, et al. (2013). Atomic Water Channel
Controlling Remarkable Properties of a Single Brain Microtubule: Correlating
Single Protein to Its Supramolecular Assembly. Biosensors and Bioelectronics, 47, pp.141-8.
Sahu, Satyajit, et al. (2013). Multi-Level
Memory-Switching Properties of a Single Brain Microtubule. Applied Physics Letters, 102, pp.123701.1-123701.4.
Lambert, Neill, et al. (2013). Quantum Biology. Nature Physics, 9, pp.10-8. "Recent
evidence suggests that a variety of organisms may harness some of the unique
features of quantum mechanics to gain a biological advantage. These features go
beyond trivial quantum effects and may include harnessing quantum coherence on
physiologically important timescales."
§6. Notes
1. See e.g.: >Gödel 1951. >Lucas 1961. >Lucas
1970. >Searle 1980. >Penrose 1989. >Penrose 1994. >Penrose 1997.
>Lucas 2010. >Searle 2010.
Such philosophically developed formal arguments are
assumed, rather than repeated, in the present paper.
2. See (herein above) the Appendix on Quantum Biology.
3. Penrose 2005,
p.1012.
4. Penrose 1997,
p.116.
5. Penrose 1997,
p.104.
6. Penrose 1997,
pp.107-8.
7. Penrose 1997, p.119.
8. (Quoted in:) Penrose 2005, p.785.
9. Penrose 1997, p.67.
10. (In:) Penrose 1997, p.144.
11. Penrose 2005, p.860.
12. Sheldrake 2012, p.20.
13. Sheldrake 2012, p.27.
14. Sheldrake 2012, p.36.
15. Sheldrake 2012, p.65.
16. Boulding 1981, pp.10-1.
17. Sheldrake 2012, p.71.
18. Sheldrake 2012, p.83.
19. Penrose 1997, p.178.
20. (Quoted in:) von Baeyer 1998, p.166.
21. Roger Penrose is
herewith gratefully acknowledged for his comments on an earlier draft of the
present paper -- for example, Penrose stated: "In fact, my viewpoint
was, right from the start, that we needed to go beyond standard QM (since
standard QM isn't 'non-algorithmic' in the sense that I need it; standard QM is
basically 'algorithmic+randomness')."
§7. Bibliography
Boulding, Kenneth E. (1981). Ecodynamics. Sage Publications:
Chaisson, Eric J. (2001). Cosmic Evolution: The Rise of Complexity in Nature.
Gödel, Kurt (1951). (His Gibb's lecture in 1951 --
see:) Gödel, Kurt (1995). Collected
Works: Volume III. Ed. Solomon Feferman.
Huxley, T. H. (1874). On the Hypothesis That Animals
Are Automata, and Its History. Fortnightly
Review, 22, (1874), pp.555-80.
Kirk, R. (2005). Zombies
and Consciousness.
Lucas, J. R. (1961). Minds, Machines and Gödel. Philosophy, 36, (1961), pp.112-27.
(Based on his 1959 lecture).
Lucas, J. R. (1970). The Freedom of the Will.
Lucas, J. R. (2010). The Gödelian Argument: Turn Over
the Page. (Pages 211-24 in:) Tandy, Charles (ed.) (2010). Death And Anti-Death, Volume 8.
Penrose, Roger (1989). The Emperor's New Mind.
Penrose, Roger (1994). Shadows of the Mind.
Penrose, Roger (1997). The Large, the Small and the Human Mind.
Penrose, Roger (2005). The Road to Reality. Alfred A. Knopf:
Penrose, Roger (2011). Cycles of Time. Alfred A. Knopf:
Searle, John R. (1980). Minds, Brains, and Programs. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
vol.3, pp.417-24.
Searle, John [R.] (2010). The Chinese Room Argument.
(Pages 293-302 in:) Tandy, Charles (ed.) (2010). Death And Anti-Death, Volume 8.
Sheldrake, Rupert (2012). Science Set
Free: 10 Paths to New Discovery. Deepak Chopra Books −
Random House:
von Baeyer, Hans Christian (1998). Maxwell's Demon. Random House:
[This Website: