Can Death Be A Harm To The Person Who
Dies?
(A Book Review By)
Charles Tandy, Ph.D.
Li, Jack. Can Death Be a Harm to the Person Who Dies?
(Philosophy and Medicine, Volume 73.)
Jack Lee of
In rough outline, Lee proceeds as
follows: (1) Show that the Epicurean argument (that it is impossible for death
to be a harm to the person who dies) is defective. (2) Construct a theory of
harm to persons that is more defensible than other theories -- and thereby
convincingly argue (with respect to the person who dies): (a) death can be harmful; (b) premature death is always harmful; and, (c) posthumous
events can be harmful. (3) Use the
new theory to ask or answer related questions (e.g. issues related to the
Lucretian Symmetry Argument).
According to Epicurus (341-270 BCE), it
is impossible for death to be a harm to the person who dies because death
cannot be experienced (a dead person can have neither experiences nor harms).
Via example cases (thought experiments) Lee shows that, contrary to Epicurus,
one can be harmed without experiencing harm. This includes cases in which one
does not experience harm because one is no longer alive (i.e. one has become a
permanent experiential blank). Thus,
so to speak, there is neither an experience
requirement nor an existence
requirement in order to be harmed. A person can be harmed without
experiencing harm (no experience) and a person can be harmed after death (no
existence).
Lee examines two major theories of harm
to persons and then constructs a third theory of his own. Thereby he explores
three possible definitions of harm to
persons. His analysis finds that harm to persons (alive or dead) involves the impairment of their objective
interests:
(1) Is harm to persons the thwarting or frustration of desires?
But dead people are "experiential blanks" and have no desires. Dead
people have no sensations, experiences, hopes, or fears. Yet, contrary to Epicurus, we have found that dead people can be
harmed. Moreover, sometimes a particular desire can be harmful instead of
helpful. Thus, objectively, the thwarting of such a desire would be good or
beneficial rather than bad or harmful.
(2) Is harm to persons the
deprivation of goods? But dead people have no goods in that they have no
life, liberty, or property. Dead people cannot pursue happiness or act to
achieve goals or dreams. Yet, contrary to
Epicurus, we have found that dead people can be harmed. Moreover, in this
context, the term "goods" seems more ambiguous and less accurate than
the term "objective interests." Sometimes a particular
"subjective interest" (e.g. a particular "desire" or a
particular "good") can be harmful instead of helpful. Thus,
objectively, the thwarting, deprivation, or impairment of such a
"subjective interest" or "desire" or "good" would
be beneficial rather than harmful.
(3) Is harm to persons the impairment of objective interests?
Persons can indeed be harmed without experiencing harm; moreover, persons can
indeed be harmed after death. A dead person is a (dead) person; every person (alive or dead) has objective interests.
Lee, following Joel Feinberg and John
Kleinig, differentiates subjective
interest ("X is interested in Y") from objective interest ("Y is in X's interests"). But
unfortunately Lee then goes on to follow Feinberg and Kleinig further [p. 68]: (A) "Y is in X's [objective]
interests" equals "X has a justifiably
claimed stake in Y"; and, (B) "X has a stake in Y" equals
"X is likely to gain or lose from Y … " Below I show that assertions (A) and (B) are
seriously flawed.
(A) Here the phrase "justifiably
claimed" is presumably used in order to differentiate objective interests
from merely subjective interests (such as certain desires or goods that are not
in our objective interests). A problem with "justifiably claimed,"
however, is that our objective interests remain our objective interests whether
or not we "claim" them. Likewise, our objective interests remain our
objective interests whether or not we "justify" them.
(B) Here the phrase "likely to gain
or lose" is used. It is perhaps natural to think of our objective
interests as somehow connected to gaining or losing. But in fact our objective interests remain
our objective interests whether or not some gain or lose is "likely"
or unlikely, more probable or less probable.
As just explained, the ordinary meaning
of “impairment of objective interests" includes the rejection of faulty
assertions A and B. But let me point out also that here impairment is to persons (persons have objective
interests). Thus it would be clearer to think of persons advancing toward their
objective interests, including the advancement of their ethical learning. Moreover, we can think of the objective interests
of all persons living and dead.
We now have a clearer definition of harm:
Harm to persons is the impairment of their advancement
toward their objective interests, including the advancement of their ethical learning. Accordingly, we do not
say a person is harmed because utopia is not achieved in the next three seconds.
Failure to secure utopia in the next three seconds is not necessarily an
impairment (major setback) to the advancement of my (or our) objective
interests.
For the practical purpose of delimiting
the scope of the monograph’s research project, Lee defines “death” so as to be
permanent and an experiential blank. Indeed, the term “death” in the present context is often
defined something like this: The permanent (irreversible) cessation (end) of
life, existence, or consciousness. I now point out, however, that even given
our present philosophic intent and context, death defined as permanent or
irreversible is not without its problems. For one thing, what is deemed
permanent or irreversible may be relative to the state of our empirical
learning (the level of our science-technology). Moreover, if empirical tests
necessarily involve empirical corroboration or empirical refutation (either or
both), then "permanent death" is in principle potentially open to
eventual refutation but not to eventual corroboration. In other words, death
viewed as a temporary condition that is potentially reversible by far-future
science-technology ("temporary death") is open to empirical
corroboration in the far-future but is not open to empirical refutation.
Is it possible that death is (or can be
made to be) a comma instead of a full-stop? (The reality of "temporarily” dead persons being revived using CPR
and other existing biomedical technology says that already, at least sometimes,
the answer is YES.) Is it possible that the set of all "permanently" dead persons can be (or, using
far-future science-technology, can be made to become) a null set? Is it possible that the set of all
"temporarily" dead persons
can include (or, using far-future science-technology, can be made to come to
include) all dead persons? It seems
that both logically and empirically the answer to both “possibility” questions
is YES. Moreover, let me point out that this answer apparently applies not only
to people and the set of all persons, but also to worlds and the set of all
universes.
Lee claims "that the death of an
elderly person who has led a full and worthwhile life is not a great misfortune
for him." [p. 81] Lee is saying
that it is NOT a great misfortune or harm if a hundred year old person permanently becomes an experiential blank (dies). On the
contrary, our analysis above seems to tell us that being "elderly"
(in the sense of age-related debility) and being (permanently) "dead"
are not in the objective interests of persons. Becoming disabled or being
mortal does not contribute to an optimal "never-ending" journey of a
person toward ultimate personhood. In the following example by Feinberg, Lee
makes modifications in brackets to support his "one-century" view [p.
81]:
“Thus, if I have an annual salary [life] of one
hundred thousand dollars [100 years], and my employer [God] gives me a fifty
thousand dollar [50 year] raise, I benefit substantially from this largesse. If
he [God] fails to give me a raise, I am not so benefited, but surely not harmed
either…If he [God] reduces me to five thousand [50 years]…however, he [God] not
merely fails to benefit me, he [God] causes me harm…”
Lee's analogy does not hold up. First of
all, God is love (not our harmful or helpful employer) and wishes us to take
the initiative and to self-advance toward ultimate personhood. Such an
adventure in discovering and advancing one's objective (ethical and other)
interests will take much longer than a mere one-century. Secondly, life is not
like a mere job or salary. If one is alive and healthy, one may be able to
obtain another job or salary. But (permanent) death ends one's life and
life-plan; one does not then obtain another life or life-plan. Beyond this,
self-improvement and world-betterment are in our objective interests. Nature
(not God) indifferently causes events like drought, earthquake, crop failure,
smallpox, AIDS, cancer, age-related debility, and death. Via the advancement of
our objective empirical interests, we learn to regulate nature; via the
advancement of our objective ethical interests, we turn the world from
indifference into love.
Lee discusses many issues and all of them
cannot be entertained in the limited space of this presentation. But I will now
mention the so-called missing subject
problem. Epicurus would ask Lee: “Who exactly is the subject of the alleged
posthumous harms?” Is it the living
person before they died, before they were harmed (the “ante-mortem person”)? Or is it the “post-mortem person” moldering in their grave? Since a decaying dead
corpse can obviously not be harmed, Lee opts for the “ante-mortem person” in his response to Epicurus. Ante-mortem persons can be wronged after
their death.
My response differs from Lee’s analysis
while sharing much in common with it. Harm to persons is the impairment of
advancement toward their objective interests. It is in the
objective interests of persons to advance toward ultimate personhood. This
includes the advancement of empirical-scientific learning and of ethical-moral
learning.
Persons can indeed be harmed without
experiencing harm; moreover, persons can indeed be harmed after death. A dead
person is a (dead) person. Considerations above suggest to me the following, a
new principle of personhood: "Once a person, always a person.”
When is one harmed -- and who is the
subject of the harm -- if one's harm is posthumous (i.e., if the harm is to a
"dead person")? In the absence of being able to make clear sense of
my new principle of personhood ("Once a person, always a person"), I
was tempted to give in to Lee's view. But fortunately for my new principle,
Troy T. Catterson came along.
Typically when we think of a person, we think of a person with a
healthy body and a bright mind. Yet sometimes we meet persons with unhealthy
bodies and unbright minds. But have we
ever met a person without a body or
without a mind? Even a ghost would have a (ghost kind of) body. And a statue
has no mind. If ghosts exist, we would say they are persons (even if their
bodies and minds function somewhat differently from yours and mine). Certainly
medical mannequins, "talking" dolls, decaying corpses, and cremated
ashes exist -- yet we do not call them persons.
Lee states: “Post-mortem person strictly speaking is an oxymoron, because all actual persons are living and therefore ante-mortem persons.” [p. 163] Is the term “post-mortem person” or “dead
person” an oxymoron? My answer, following Catterson, is NO. Dead persons exist
now as real facts about the past. The past is a fixed (determined) unity that will always exist even if the universe
dies. This is one reason why scientists and philosophers say that time travel
into the past is in principle possible but that changing the past is impossible
even in principle. (However time branching seems logically possible.)
Catterson presents a plausible account of
time where the past exists in the present. Indeed, Catterson argues that
"there can be no coherent conception of an A-series that posits the
passing away of the past ... thus there could be no possible world where the
dead do not exist." Accordingly, both dead persons and living persons have
no choice but to be presently existing. A presently existing dead person may be
characterized as person-identity fact-information
that: (1) lacks a mind that functions as a living person at the present moment
(e.g., is an "experiential blank"); and, (2) lacks a body that
functions as a living person at the present moment. These two "lacks"
correspond to two aspects of posthumous harms: a person can be harmed without
experiencing harm and a person can be harmed even if not presently alive.
It is false that a dead person does not
presently exist at all. Thus there is no missing
subject problem. It is the (presently existing) dead person
(fact-information, not cremated ashes) who is the subject of (present)
posthumous harms and benefits.
Moreover, as previously stated, it is
possible that the death of a person is not permanent. As John Hick points out,
"permanent death" cannot be
empirically corroborated in a finite period of time; but “permanent death” can
be empirically refuted in a finite period of time (and in individual cases has
in some sense been refuted often via CPR or advanced medical techniques). In
addition, as I have pointed out, this logical principle applies not only to the
death of persons but also to the death of universes. (To empirically show that universe U will never be resurrected, we
would have to wait forever.)
If the popular "big bang"
theory of the universe (or any number of alternative theories) is correct, then
presumably most of what is real lies in the future (not in the present or the
past). Thus our present and past experiences (such as: "Nothing is certain
but death and taxes") probably do not constitute a very good
representative sample of reality. However the fact that person P really existed
in the past as a living person means that it really is empirically possible for
person P to exist as a living person. (This is something that cannot be said of
fictional- or fantasy-characters.) Based on considerations above -- scientists,
philosophers, and other living persons, in advancing their objective interests
(including their empirical, artistic, and ethical learning) should love all
dead persons and take into account the objective (real) interests of dead
persons.
Unburying the dead -- resurrecting all
dead persons by scientific means -- may not yet be at hand. Indeed, developing
a beloved community consisting of all the living and all the dead will offer
great challenges -- but also great benefits. As we look toward the future, as
we consider the vast varied ranges and regions of reality ahead, it would seem
arrogant in the extreme not to engage with reality in our sacred "common
task," the beloved community.
From the foregoing it should now be obvious
that I consider personhood to be
important to the issue of harm to persons even though Lee’s monograph does not
examine the concept. So before I close, let me refer the reader to the work of Michael
Tooley. Here I briefly articulate four sets of conclusions taken from Tooley’s
insightful arguments: (1) An entity that is not a person but is a potential
person (e.g. a human fertilized egg) does not have the intrinsic moral status
of a person. (2) An entity that is not a person but is a member of the human
species (e.g. a brain-absent human infant) does not have the intrinsic moral
status of a person. (3) Probably some non-human animals are persons (and thus
have the intrinsic moral status of persons). (4) We should not confuse the
(objective) interests of persons with the interests of other entities (i.e.
non-persons). Anything that contributes to the proper functioning of something
is in that thing’s interest, as when we say that it is in the interest of a
radio or television not to be exposed to high temperature (and thus dysfunction).
But (objective) interests are another matter with reference to persons, as when
we say that it is in the interest of a human person not to be exposed to high
temperature (and thus die). When making moral decisions, these two uses of the
term “interests” should be kept in mind. And
I would add: Once a person, always a person.
Now a few “housekeeping” chores. Lee states:
“Throughout this book I use ‘he’, ‘him’, or ‘his’ as gender-neutral pronouns.”
[p. 139] In previous decades this would
have been interpreted as progressive; in today’s setting, this kind of too-easy
blanket statement is often seen as sexist. In terms of grammatical and
typographical mistakes, they are numerous (given the standards expected from
Kluwer Academic Publishers). Cryptographers and information theorists point out
that often such errors do not in fact prevent us from successful deciphering. Occasionally
however it created for me difficulty. In the quotation above regarding “Lee
makes modifications in brackets to support his ‘one-century’ view [p. 81]” --
he says: “reduces me to five thousand [50 years]” but I was unsure if he meant
to say “reduces me to five thousand [5 years]” although either seems to work adequately
enough since either is considerably less than 100 years.
Finally, my summary recommendation. Lee’s
monograph deserves to be widely read and circulated. It is an excellent contribution
to the literature. I believe that most scholars interested in the philosophy of
death or in the concept of harm to persons will find it stimulating them to
deep and fruitful inquiry.
REFERENCES
Catterson, T. 2003.
“Letting The Dead Bury Their Own Dead: A Reply To Palle Yourgrau,” In Death
And Anti-Death, Volume 1: One Hundred Years After N. F. Fedorov (1829-1903),
ed. C. Tandy, 413-426.
Hick,
J. H. 1963. Philosophy of Religion.
Li, J.
2003. “When Is One Harmed By One’s Own
Death?,” In Death And Anti-Death, Volume 1: One Hundred
Years After N. F. Fedorov (1829-1903), ed. C. Tandy, 397-412.
Tandy, C. 2002.
“Toward A New Theory Of Personhood,” In The Philosophy Of Robert Ettinger,
ed. C. Tandy, 157-188.
Tandy, C. 2003.
“N. F. Fedorov And The Common Task: A 21st Century Reexamination,”
In Death
And Anti-Death, Volume 1: One Hundred Years After N. F. Fedorov (1829-1903),
ed. C. Tandy, 29-46.
Tandy, C. 2003.
“Unburying The Dead: Posthumous Harms And Posthumous Benefits -- A Solution To
The Missing Subject Problem,” In Death And Anti-Death, Volume 1: One Hundred
Years After N. F. Fedorov (1829-1903), ed. C. Tandy, 427-430.
Tandy, C. 2007.
"Types Of Time Machines And Practical Time Travel," Journal
Of Futures Studies, Volume 11, Number 3 (February 2007). (ISSN 10276084.)
Tooley,
M. 2001. “Personhood,” In A Companion To Bioethics, ed. H.
Kuhse and P. Singer, 117-126.
REVISIONS
[Original:
[Revised:
[Revised:
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The above article has been reproduced by
permission of Charles Tandy; the
copyright and intellectual property rights belong to Charles Tandy. Copyright © 2008 by Charles Tandy.
about the
author
Charles Tandy, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Humanities at
Can Death Be A Harm To The Person Who
Dies? (Charles Tandy)
ABSTRACT: According
to this review of Can Death Be a Harm to the Person Who Dies? by Jack Li (aka
Jack Lee), the monograph successfully espouses a new theory of harm. Harm to
persons is neither the thwarting of desires nor the deprivation of goods, but
the impairment of objective interests. The argument concludes (with respect to
the person who dies): death can be
harmful (contra Epicurus); premature death is always harmful; and, posthumous events can be harmful. Other topics, including the Lucretian Symmetry
Argument, are discussed by Li/Lee; the reviewer explores the concepts “death”
and “personhood”, sometimes disagreeing with Li/Lee. However the reviewer
believes the monograph deserves wide readership.
CROSS-REFERENCE
Tandy,
Charles. 2008. “Review Of Jack Li’s Can Death Be A Harm To The Person Who Dies?,”
Journal
Of Humanities (
ABSTRACT AND
KEYWORDS
Can Death Be
A Harm To The Person Who Dies?
Charles Tandy, Ph.D.
(A Book Review Of)
Li, Jack. Can Death Be a Harm to the Person Who Dies?
(Philosophy and Medicine, Volume 73.)
According to this review of
Can
Death Be a Harm to the Person Who Dies? by Jack Li (aka Jack Lee), the
monograph successfully espouses a new theory of harm. Harm to persons is
neither the thwarting of desires nor the deprivation of goods, but the
impairment of objective interests. The argument concludes (with respect to the
person who dies): death can be
harmful (contra Epicurus); premature death is always harmful; and, posthumous events can be harmful. Other topics, including the Lucretian Symmetry
Argument, are discussed by Li/Lee; the reviewer explores the concepts “death”
and “personhood”, sometimes disagreeing with Li/Lee. However the reviewer
believes the monograph deserves wide readership.
KEYWORDS: A-series; benefits;
Catterson [Troy T. Catterson]; desires; Epicurus; goods; interests; Lucretian
Symmetry Argument; resurrection; Tooley [Michael Tooley]
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ria.edu/papers Contact Dr. Tandy: tandy@ria.edu GoTo:
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