(=pages 211-228)

Roger Penrose, Rupert Sheldrake, And The Future Of Consciousness

(by Charles Tandy)






Death And Anti-Death, Volume 11:

Ten Years After Donald Davidson (1917-2003)

Charles Tandy, Editor



Ria University Press

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Abstract Of Pages 211-228


Roger Penrose, Rupert Sheldrake, And The Future Of Consciousness

Charles Tandy

      Roger Penrose argues that consciousness must be hyper-algorithmic (not-computable). Penrose suggested we study the brain with a view to how macro-level quantum effects might take place there despite the hostile (noisy, hot) environment; recent empirical developments in quantum biology seem to support Penrose. Penrose says a hyper-algorithmic quantum theory is needed. Rupert Sheldrake points out that contrary to traditional scientific dogma, the universe may be non-entropic; serious theories (Big Bang; Cosmic Inflation) by prominent living physicists seem to lead to such a conclusion. If Penrose (on consciousness) and Sheldrake (on entropy) are both correct, then the future may bring a never-ending expansion of consciousness rather than its extinction.

      KEYWORDS: Entropy; Energy; Computation; Quantum biology; Determinism; Hyperalgorithmity; Algorithm; Kurt Gödel; Quantum gravity; Cohomology.





Roger Penrose, Rupert Sheldrake, And The Future Of Consciousness


Charles Tandy




§1. First Remarks  

§2. Penrose on Consciousness

§3. Sheldrake on Entropy

§4. Last Remarks

§5. Appendix on Quantum Biology

§6. Notes

§7. Bibliography



§1. First Remarks   


      Some folks believe they are competent in both science and philosophy. Upon closer examination, I typically find such persons competent in only science or philosophy (or neither). Roger Penrose and Rupert Sheldrake seem to be exceptional in that they are competent in both scientific and philosophical endeavors. Of course, being competent does not mean that your creative ideas, whether scientific or philosophical, are correct.


      Most new ideas, even by highly competent individuals, are bad ideas. With this in mind, I am going to present some of the thoughts of Roger Penrose and of Rupert Sheldrake that I find well argued -- thoughts (in the event they should prove sufficiently fruitful) with "revolutionary" implications for the future of consciousness. These thoughts tend to fall on the intersection of science and philosophy. Below I have selected only a few hypotheses (of many) that have been proposed by Penrose and by Sheldrake. More specifically, I will focus on consciousness (according to Penrose) and on entropy (according to Sheldrake), with a view toward the future of consciousness.


§2. Penrose on Consciousness


      Until the 20th century, it was assumed by many scientists that the laws of nature were both deterministic and mechanistic. Today, many quantum physicists no longer believe in universal determinism but do believe that all science worth having must be mechanistic (computable or algorithmic). It is assumed by many scientists that human behavior (and related matters -- e.g., consciousness) must be explainable in a mechanical-computable or chemical-biological kind of way.


      But Roger Penrose and others have developed arguments as to why consciousness must, instead, be non-algorithmic (not-computable). 1  Penrose has suggested that this should lead us to investigate whether or how there are quantum effects at the macro-level in animal or human brains that might help us understand how it is possible for matter to be aware or conscious. Penrose pointed out that room temperature or brain temperature did not seem to support his argument even though otherwise his argument seemed to make sense. Penrose suggested we study the brain with a view to how macro-level quantum effects might take place there despite the hostile (noisy, hot) environment. (Today's quantum computers require extreme cold to avoid decoherence by thermal vibrations, but the brain operates at warm biological temperatures.)


      Recent empirical developments seem to support Penrose even more than he expected. 2  Penrose is calling for more empirical studies, as he does not think it wise to rely on only a few surprising results even when the experiments were carried out with integrity. The recent results seem to say that macro-level quantum effects are important in biological photosynthesis, in avian magneto-reception, and in biological microtubule function. In other words, one is now tempted to say that macro-level quantum effects are common or ubiquitous in biological organisms. If we set up the proper empirical experiments, present technology allows us to study such (apparent) "macro-level" quantum effects. Present technology even allows us to study (subatomic) "particle-level" quantum effects (e.g., using the new super-collider in the vicinity of Geneva, Switzerland); on the other hand: "No [empirical] experiment to date seems to have yet got very close to exploring the [much smaller] 'quantum-gravity' level." 3   


      Penrose asks us to consider whether quantum theory should be modified or superseded if we are to properly explain animal awareness or human consciousness. Just as scientific explanation no longer requires a deterministic theory, perhaps we should now ask whether scientific explanation requires a mechanistic (algorithmic or computational) theory. In the present paper, I will refer to the Penrose (non-computational) approach to consciousness as "ha" theory or HyperAlgorithmity.


      Penrose explains that wave-particle (or U-R: Unitary evolution - state Reduction) quantum theory is as much self-contradictory as it is complementary. (U or Unitary evolution is continuous and deterministic; R or state Reduction is discontinuous and probabilistic.) M. C. Escher knew Penrose and drew the famous, and famously impossible, Penrose Triangle or Tribar. (The study of such impossibilities is known as cohomology, which requires a holistic or nonlocal view of things.) Penrose suggests that present quantum theory is likewise impossible. One can study any one part of the Penrose Triangle and it makes perfect sense. It is only if one ("consciously"?) stands back and attempts to take in the entire Tribar that one sees or understands that it is impossible. Likewise, according to Penrose, we have fitted parts together to get our standard quantum theory; when we stand back, we can see that quantum theory is made of (wave-particle or U-R) parts that ultimately do not fit together. Quantum theory otherwise seems workable and useful, and perhaps this is the best we can do. But Penrose says that quantum theory needs to be modified or superseded if we are to explain non-algorithmic realities such as awareness or understanding or reflection or "standing back" or creative imagination or consciousness. It seems that there must be hyperalgorithmic laws of nature, as yet undiscovered.


      Some may say that our brain or consciousness operates (entirely) according to algorithms. However unless one simply posits this as an assumption, this seems unlikely; it does not seem to capture human experiences such as red perceptions, sad feelings, creative insights, and our time-asymmetric struggles for truth, justice, and world betterment. Penrose maintains that biological evolution would not select for those skilled at building grand mathematical theories but would select for those who can understand a wide variety of many things -- this includes empathetic understanding of the behavior of animals (and how to avoid or kill or domesticate them). "Human beings develop this  quality  of  general  understanding  and  it  is  not  a  computa-tional quality because mathematical understanding is not." 4  Consciousness is functional and not a meaningless mere-epiphenomenon. This seems to be the case for many animals, including humans.


      Penrose suggests that conscious intelligence requires understanding (and that understanding requires awareness) -- but an algorithm or computational system does not have conscious intelligence or understanding. Chess "is a computational game and so ultimately it would be possible to compute every possibility" 5 ;  this means that the mere human (with no computer assistance) must ultimately experience defeat in a contest with a computer sufficiently advanced (say, at approximately a year 1999 level of computer chess-playing sophistication). Human chess players understand when they have lost a chess match, but computer chess players do not understand when they have won a chess match. Consciousness goes beyond calculation or, rather, is different from calculation. Some chess problems easy for humans are difficult for computers, and some chess problems easy for (brute force or huge memory) computers are difficult for humans. It is well documented in the literature that computers play chess differently than the way humans do. A computer and a human would tackle the following task very differently: "Find an odd number that is the sum of two even numbers." 6  A human may have limited ability to understand and limited ability to calculate, while a computer has no ability to understand but hugely impressive ability to calculate (and to store memory). Show your children various examples of numbers (using, say, apples and blocks and pennies) and (to the pleasure of Plato) they will come to understand the notion of numbers; we do not give our children a set of rules or algorithms in order to acquire such a notion.  


      Consciousness is very different from anything else we know about in the universe. Consciousness is outrageous! It seems that a new, even outrageous, scientific theory is needed unless we choose to ignore the fact of consciousness.


      Mathematics is the language of science. Some branches of mathematics are Algorithmic (computational); other branches of mathematics are HyperAlgorithmic (not-computational). NB: Mathematical models do not have to be algorithmic! According to Penrose, HyperAlgorithmic mathematical models and theories (whether deterministic or nondeterministic) -- when they fit empirical experimental results -- should be permitted to count as scientific explanations. Indeed, mathematicians such as Penrose have used the tiling of a plane with polyominoes to construct toy (model) universes that are deterministic but are not computable; "The different states of this [rule-based] deterministic but non-computable toy universe are given in terms of pairs of finite sets of polyominoes." 7  (Clearly, determinism and computability are not the same thing.) Penrose also asks if the (inconsistent or contradictory) mathematical formalisms we paste together and call (probabilistic or nondeterministic) quantum theory should count as a proper scientific explanation of actual reality. Stephen Hawking weighs in: "All I'm concerned with is that the theory should predict the results of measurements." 8  


      In 1874, Thomas Henry Huxley argued that consciousness is a mere epiphenomena of (particular) physical interactions. Today such issues are sometimes discussed using thought experiments involving philosophical zombies (hypothetical entities that look and act like humans, but lack consciousness). For example, one may ask if both zombies and humans are reducible to computations or algorithms running on (human-body-appearing) hardware. Moreover, if consciousness is more than a mere epiphenomena, then macro level events are involved in consciousness and conscious behavior. Using hypothetical thought experiments, one may sometimes seem to be able to conjure-up at least three different kinds of "humanoid" entities as follows: (1) Mere-zombies (entities that look and act like humans, but lack consciousness); (2) Zombies-plus (entities that look and act like humans, and have consciousness as a mere epiphenomena); and, (3) Human-persons (entities that look and act like humans, and have consciousness of the sort where macro level events are involved with consciousness and conscious behavior). To what extent the actions or behaviors of these various (conjured-up) entities may or may not be predictable, whether in principle or in practice, is beyond the purview of the present article.


      Presumably, Penrose's ha theory (not yet invented!) would explain not only ("human-person") consciousness but also quantum gravity and the weirdness of quantum events. Many readers are aware of nonlocality (or weird "action at a distance" which nevertheless is said not to be in contradiction to Relativity theory). But recent decades have presented us with additional strange findings from empirical experiments. I quote Penrose: 9    


It is quite extraordinary that quantum mechanics enables you to test whether something might have happened but didn't happen. It tests what philosophers call counterfactuals. It is remarkable that quantum mechanics allows real effects to result from counterfactuals!


According to philosopher of science Abner Shimony: 10     


The most radical concept of quantum theory is that a complete state of the system … is not exhausted by a catalogue of actual properties of the system but must include potentialities. … this indefiniteness is objective. … These features of objective indefiniteness, objective chance and objective probability are summed up by characterizing the quantum state as a network of potentialities.


Penrose believes that ha theory may use geometry (as distinguished from computation), use notions of spacetime (as distinguished from notions of space), and use so-called complex numbers or perhaps even higher-genus numbers beyond complex numbers (as distinguished from so-called real numbers).


      Penrose would also like to think that ha theory (to appear sometime in the 21st century) may suggest to us an ontology of some sort, or will be consistent with his own personal philosophy of reality; nevertheless, he is not sure that his own ontology is itself self-consistent (see below). However "present-day quantum mechanics has no credible ontology." 11  Penrose hypothesizes that the World consists of at least three ontological realms or worlds he labels Platonic, Physical, and Mental. The Platonic realm is identified with mathematics, which is objective, timeless, spaceless, and necessary; it exists absolutely or necessarily. (Penrose is willing to allow us to further identify this realm with the Good, the True, the Beautiful.) Part of the Platonic world seems to have a direct (if mysterious) relationship to the Physical world; after all, mathematics is the language of physics. Part of the Physical realm seems to have a direct (if mysterious) relationship to Mental reality. In turn, part of the Mental world seems to have a direct (if mysterious) relationship to mathematics or the Platonic realm. One may then step back in order to view holistically Penrose's ("non-dual-istic"!) tri-model of reality: The "impossible triangle" of the three ontological realms seems to have a part of each world encompassing the whole of the next. Perhaps each world "thinks it owns" all three worlds; however Penrose also broaches the notion that it is indeed Platonic reality that ultimately governs all three realms.


§3. Sheldrake on Entropy


      Like Roger Penrose, Rupert Sheldrake finds "universal mechanisticism" (my words) quite unbelievable. But unlike Penrose, Sheldrake tends to use the term "materialism" (or, sometimes, "physicalism") for this view of the world. (That is, in Penrose's view, Roger Penrose is attempting to discover and articulate new physical laws -- hyperalgorithmic ones -- applicable to the physical universe.) The reader should keep in mind these various uses of words or terms (and related words or terms) when interpreting (below) what Sheldrake says about entropy. Many scientists and thinkers (including Bertrand Russell and H. G. Wells) used to believe in something like a Final Law of Entropy, by which was meant that the universe must inevitably run down.


      Isaac Newton maintained, for theological reasons, that the universe would end in a singularity sometime before the year 2345 (but not before the year 2060). 12  Sheldrake is "convinced that the sciences, for all their successes, are being stifled by outmoded beliefs" such as that the universe will in the long run necessarily run down, arriving at a bland entropic end state. 13  Today, this belief by many scientists is not based on theology but on universal-materialism (hereinafter: "materialism"). But it is impossible to consistently hold to materialism, says Sheldrake: "Is a scientist operating mechanistically when he proposes a theory of materialism? … he believes he is putting forward views that are true, not just doing what his brain makes him do." 14  Sheldrake advocates against mechanism and against vitalism, and for holism (organism-ism).


      For many scientists, a major building block in their belief in materialism and in entropy is known as the First Law of Thermodynamics (conservation of matter and energy). But according to Sheldrake, "no" is the more likely correct answer to the question "Is the total amount of matter and energy always the same?" For example, the Big Bang theory of the origin of the universe is widely accepted -- however: "There was no conservation of matter and energy if the universe arose from nothing." 15  


      Then there is the Second Law of Thermodynamics; often in the past it was identified as the entropy law. Social scientist Kenneth Boulding explained it this way: 16 


The entropy concept is an unfortunate one, something like phlogiston (which turned out to be negative oxygen), in the sense that entropy is negative potential. We can generalize the second law in the form of a law of diminishing potential rather than of increasing entropy, stated in the form: If anything happens, it is because there was a potential for it happening, and after it has happened that potential has been used up. This form of stating the law opens up the possibility that potential might be re-created in particular forms. An example would be the biological potential of the fertilized egg for producing the life history of the corresponding organism. This potential is gradually used up as the organism ages; finally it is exhausted and the organism dies. If, however, in the process the organism fertilizes another egg, the biological potential is re-created, though never of course in exactly the same form.                              


If a physicist ignores things like biological evolution and evolving biological complexity, and pretends or postulates that the universe is an isolated system, then the physicist may be tempted to conclude from the Second Thermodynamics Law that the universe must inevitably run down. While most scientists and most physicists are not cosmologists (cosmological physicists), some of the  more serious cosmological theories today -- since the recent inference that so-called dark energy makes up over 70% of the matter-energy of the universe -- tell a different story: "Far from running out of steam, the universe is now like a perpetual-motion machine, expanding because of dark energy, and creating more dark energy by expanding." 17  


      Thinkers have long speculated as to the relationship between physics and biology. For many decades a standard picture has been that biological systems are islands of order (or anti-entropy) within, or produced at the expense of, an otherwise increasingly disorderly (or entropic) universe. Such an image can be used to explain why either entropy or anti-entropy or both may increase in the future. Such a picture is a kind of explanation rather than an argument; Sheldrake is asking us to look at the arguments (per above and below). Sheldrake is not claiming to know the correct answer beyond all doubt, but is emphasizing that there are good reasons to seriously doubt the old entropic view.


      Two arguments which Sheldrake does not greatly emphasize I will now emphasize; one argument (or cosmological theory) comes from Eric J. Chaisson and the other from Roger Penrose. Eric J. Chaisson is a physicist and systems scientist of considerable status. This is a shortcut way of saying that I will simply and briefly present the conclusions of his argument in Cosmic Evolution: The Rise of Complexity in Nature. Chaisson explains why there is good reason to believe that the universe may be immortal. Chaisson explains why there is good reason to believe that cosmic evolution may be never-ending. In short, it seems that our universe is increasing in both (!) disorder/entropy/randomness and order/negentropy/information. Chaisson attempts to explain in physical- and systems-science terms how this putatively paradoxical situation works and how the evolution of complexity can be never-ending. The classical (deterministic) physics of old used to predict an ultimate entropic end state for the universe. But (p.29) "a more modern analysis is not so dire, suggesting that the maximum possible entropy will likely never be attained. In an expanding Universe, the actual and maximum entropies both increase, yet not at the same rate; a gap opens between them and grows larger over the course of time, causing the Universe to increasingly depart from [an end-of-the-universe or final-entropy scenario.] … We need not be so pessimistic, indeed it is this inability of the cosmos to ever reach true maximum disorder that allows order, or lack of disorder, to emerge in localized, open systems." Indeed (p.219), a "perpetual [!] stream toward richness, diversity, and complexity, the outcome of which cannot be foreseen, may be the true fate of the Universe."


      Now I preface Roger Penrose's Cycles of Time: Today's cosmological physicists and quantum physicists study the very large and the very small respectively. They seem quite willing to speculate that in one physical context gravity may act as an attracting force and in another physical context gravity may act as a repelling force. Thus (once again) depending on how we choose to use our terminology, we may be tempted to say that gravity in one context becomes anti-gravity in another context. I mention this so as to try by analogy to introduce Penrose's Cycles of Time theory. Might thermodynamics in one physical context act as an entropic force and in another physical context act as an anti-entropic force? Or, to put it another way, contrary to standard big-bang theory, is the Cycles of Time theory correct that universal thermodynamics combined with cosmic inflation necessarily and always lead to a never-ending series of big-bang "beginnings" (as if the universe perpetually reinvents itself over an infinity of ever-expanding eons)? I must admit to not understanding the Cycles of Time mathematics, but the upshot is that a dynamic universe always has existed and a dynamic universe always will exist (that is, in the event the Penrose theory of perpetual big-bangs should be correct). Others have offered other theories -- serious non-big-bang theories or serious multiverse theories that are ultimately non-entropic (as used herein, non-entropic obviously means "no necessary ultimate final end or running down of the universe/multiverse" -- as distinguished from meaning "non-thermodynamic"). Based on the present paragraph and the previous paragraphs, it seems easy enough to conclude that whether one accepts the standard big-bang theory or another serious scientific theory, it is reasonable to (tentatively) reject the Final Law of Entropy concept. 


      Few scientists, including Sheldrake, are prepared to accept Penrose's Cycles of Time theory. However on the other hand, Sheldrake emphasizes that some of the (serious) theories say that the vacuum of spacetime at the quantum level is full of energy; indeed, many quantum physicists alive today believe this to be the case. Sheldrake suggests that future technology may be able to tap into zero-point (quantum-vacuum) energy for practical use. Moreover, beyond this, at a more down-to-earth biological level, Sheldrake himself argues at length that the actual empirical "evidence for energy conservation in living organisms is weak." 18   Considerations such as the above seem to tell scientists and nonscientists alike that entropy is a fake in that it does not have the last word. 


§4. Last Remarks


      Thus, ha theory may be said to have the last laugh. In a non-entropic universe, hyperalgorithmic consciousness may continue to continue to continue without end. A so-called "technological singularity" identifiable with hyperalgorithmic superconscious-ness (as distinguished from algorithmitic supercomputation) may be in our future. As Penrose puts it, "it might be possible to have a conscious entity that is not biological at all, in the sense that we use the term 'biology' at the present time; but it would not be possible for an entity be conscious if it did not incorporate the particular type of physical process [HyperAlgorithmity] that I maintain is an essential." 19  If this is so, then the future may bring a never-ending expansion of consciousness rather than its extinction. In the words of the great Isaac Asimov: "Once we expect theories to collapse and to be supplanted by more useful generalizations, the collapsing theory becomes not the gray remnant of a broken today, but the herald of a new and brighter tomorrow." 20-21 


§5. Appendix on Quantum Biology


      Are there macro-level quantum effects in biological organisms? Some recent empirical results seem to say that macro-level quantum effects are important in a wide variety of (or in all?) biological organisms. This apparently includes processes related to biological photosynthesis, avian magneto-reception, and biological microtubule function.


      Here are some relevant citations:


"Quantum Biology: Current Status and Opportunities"

Institute of Advanced Studies, University of Surrey.

10 presentations plus a filmed group discussion.

(Held on September 17-18, 2012).



"Quantum Effects in Biological Systems 2012"

University of California, Berkeley.

37 presentations.

(Held on June 4-6, 2012).



"Quantum Biology and the Hidden Nature of Nature"

World Science Festival.

(Held on June 1, 2012).

3 participants plus 1 moderator.


[Updated URL: <http://worldsciencefestival.com/videos/quantum_biology>.]


"Research Projects -- Quantum Biology"

Theoretical and Computational Biophysics Group,

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

19 papers plus 9 ongoing research projects.



Quantum Consciousness (Website of Stuart Hameroff, M.D.).



Center for Consciousness Studies at the University of Arizona.

(Directed by Stuart Hameroff, M.D.).

Available from <www.consciousness.arizona.edu>.

For example, see:

Bandyopadhyay, Anirban (2010). Direct Experimental Evidence for Quantum States in Microtubules and Topological Invariance. Toward a Science of Consciousness 2011 Abstracts.


Bandyopadhyay, Anirban (2011). Study of Opto-Electronic Properties of a Single Microtubule in the Microwave Regime. From <www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA554174>.


Google Workshop on Quantum Biology (October 22, 2010).

Available from <www.youtube.com>.

For example, see:

Bandyopadhyay, Anirban (2010). Experimental Studies on a Single Microtubule.

For example, see:

Hameroff, Stuart (2010). Clarifying the Tubulin Bit/Qubit -- Defending the Penrose-Hameroff Orch OR Model of Quantum Computation in Microtubules.

For example, see:

Neven, Hartmut (2010). Welcome and Introduction. "Surprisingly robust quantum effects have been observed in warm biological systems."


Engel, Gregory S., et al. (2007). Evidence for Wavelike Energy Transfer through Quantum Coherence in Photosynthetic Systems. Nature, 446, pp.782-6.


Ball, Philip (2011). Physics of Life: The Dawn of Quantum Biology. Nature, 474, pp.272-4.


Sahu, Satyajit, et al. (2013). Atomic Water Channel Controlling Remarkable Properties of a Single Brain Microtubule: Correlating Single Protein to Its Supramolecular Assembly. Biosensors and Bioelectronics, 47, pp.141-8.


Sahu, Satyajit, et al. (2013). Multi-Level Memory-Switching Properties of a Single Brain Microtubule. Applied Physics Letters, 102, pp.123701.1-123701.4.


Lambert, Neill, et al. (2013). Quantum Biology. Nature Physics, 9, pp.10-8. "Recent evidence suggests that a variety of organisms may harness some of the unique features of quantum mechanics to gain a biological advantage. These features go beyond trivial quantum effects and may include harnessing quantum coherence on physiologically important timescales."


§6. Notes


1. See e.g.: >Gödel 1951. >Lucas 1961. >Lucas 1970. >Searle 1980. >Penrose 1989. >Penrose 1994. >Penrose 1997. >Lucas 2010. >Searle 2010.

Such philosophically developed formal arguments are assumed, rather than repeated, in the present paper.


2. See (herein above) the Appendix on Quantum Biology.


3. Penrose 2005, p.1012.


4. Penrose 1997, p.116.


5. Penrose 1997, p.104.


6. Penrose 1997, pp.107-8.


7. Penrose 1997, p.119.


8. (Quoted in:) Penrose 2005, p.785.


9. Penrose 1997, p.67.


10. (In:) Penrose 1997, p.144.


11. Penrose 2005, p.860.


12. Sheldrake 2012, p.20.


13. Sheldrake 2012, p.27.


14. Sheldrake 2012, p.36.


15. Sheldrake 2012, p.65.


16. Boulding 1981, pp.10-1.


17. Sheldrake 2012, p.71.


18. Sheldrake 2012, p.83.


19. Penrose 1997, p.178.


20. (Quoted in:) von Baeyer 1998, p.166.


21. Roger Penrose is herewith gratefully acknowledged for his comments on an earlier draft of the present paper -- for example, Penrose stated: "In fact, my viewpoint was, right from the start, that we needed to go beyond standard QM (since standard QM isn't 'non-algorithmic' in the sense that I need it; standard QM is basically 'algorithmic+randomness')."


§7. Bibliography


Boulding, Kenneth E. (1981). Ecodynamics. Sage Publications: Beverly Hills and London. (Originally published in 1978).


Chaisson, Eric J. (2001). Cosmic Evolution: The Rise of Complexity in Nature. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA.


Gödel, Kurt (1951). (His Gibb's lecture in 1951 -- see:) Gödel, Kurt (1995). Collected Works: Volume III. Ed. Solomon Feferman. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK. (See pp.290-323; see especially p.310).


Huxley, T. H. (1874). On the Hypothesis That Animals Are Automata, and Its History. Fortnightly Review, 22, (1874), pp.555-80.


Kirk, R. (2005). Zombies and Consciousness. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK.


Lucas, J. R. (1961). Minds, Machines and Gödel. Philosophy, 36, (1961), pp.112-27. (Based on his 1959 lecture).


Lucas, J. R. (1970). The Freedom of the Will. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK.


Lucas, J. R. (2010). The Gödelian Argument: Turn Over the Page. (Pages 211-24 in:) Tandy, Charles (ed.) (2010). Death And Anti-Death, Volume 8. Ria University Press: Palo Alto, CA. (Based on <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~jrlucas/Godel/turn.html>).


Penrose, Roger (1989). The Emperor's New Mind. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK.


Penrose, Roger (1994). Shadows of the Mind. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK.


Penrose, Roger (1997). The Large, the Small and the Human Mind. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK.


Penrose, Roger (2005). The Road to Reality. Alfred A. Knopf: New York. (Originally published in 2004).


Penrose, Roger (2011). Cycles of Time. Alfred A. Knopf: New York.  (Originally published in 2010).


Searle, John R. (1980). Minds, Brains, and Programs. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol.3, pp.417-24.


Searle, John [R.] (2010). The Chinese Room Argument. (Pages 293-302 in:) Tandy, Charles (ed.) (2010). Death And Anti-Death, Volume 8. Ria University Press: Palo Alto, CA. (Based on <http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Chinese_room_argument>).


Sheldrake, Rupert (2012). Science Set Free: 10 Paths to New Discovery. Deepak Chopra Books − Random House: New York.


von Baeyer, Hans Christian (1998). Maxwell's Demon. Random House: New York.



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